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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
NOTE ON APPLICABLE LAW 
The Trust invokes alter ego liability to reach Gerald Rice, the stockholder of Rice 
Development, Inc., a California corporation. (R. 1356 If 2). "[The] liability of a 
stockholder for corporate debts and the extent and character of that liability are to be 
determined by the law of the state [of incorporation] . . . ." Cascade Energy and Metals 
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1575 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 849 
(1990)(applying Utah law). 
California and Utah alter ego law is more or less comparable. Id.("California's 
standard for piercing the corporate veil does not appear to be materially different from 
Utah's.") Cf. Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 
1979) and Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1957). 
California, however (applicable to Rice Development, Inc.), requires a finding of 
bad faith. Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 CalApp.2d 825, 838 
(1962)("bad faith in one form or another is an underlying consideration and will be found 
in some form or another in those cases wherein the trial court was justified in 
disregarding the corporate entity. . . ."). See also TWM Homes, Inc. v. Atherwood Realty 
& Inv. Co., 214 Cal.App.2d 826, 852 (1963). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when, based on 
unchallenged findings that (i) there was no fraud or self-dealing, (ii) no harm to the 
partnerships, (iii) no injustice to undo or prevent, (iv) no sufficient unity of interest, (v) 
no finding of bad faith, and (vi) findings that many corporate formalities were observed, 
it declined to impose alter ego liability on Gerald H. Rice ("Rice" or "Mr. Rice"), the 
principal owner of Rice Development, Inc. ("Rice Inc.") and Rice Development, LLC 
("Rice LLC"). 
Standard of Review: Because this issue requires a "determination of whether a 
given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law," it presents a mixed 
question of fact and law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, 
"[the trial court is afforded] some measure of discretion [for its] application of law to a 
given fact situation." In re Gen. Determination of Rights of Water, 98 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 
2004). The scope of discretion depends on the issue. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38. The 
decision not to impose alter ego liability will be affirmed if supported by "substantial 
record evidence." Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah App. 1987); Hansen v. 
Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102,1106 (Utah App. 1988). 
This standard applies because the question of alter ego is exceptionally fact-
sensitive. Indeed, the central question—whether observing the corporate form would 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice or an inequitable result—is left to "the conscience of 
the court. . . ." Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water Inc., 789 P.2d 
24, 26 (Utah 1990). These subsidiary questions are factual, reviewed for clear error. 
Hansen, 748 P.2d at 1106. See also Centurian Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 562 P.2d 1252, 
1253 (Utah 1977)("if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence, or from lack of evidence 
. . . we would not disturb the ruling of the trial court."). 
The measure of discretion in these circumstances turns on factors such as: 
(1) whether "the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so 
complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all 
these facts can be spelled out"; (2) whether "the situation to which the legal 
principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate 
judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors 
should be outcome determinative"; and (3) whether "the trial judge has 
observed 'facts,5 such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to 
the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record 
available to appellate courts." 
Gen. Determination, 98 P.3d at 11, quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39. 
A century of litigation has failed to produce a single, manageable rule. In this case, 
testing again whether corporate obligations should be visited on an individual, these 
factors warrant wide discretion. "It is the general rule that the conditions under which a 
corporate entity may be disregarded vary according to the circumstances in each case." 
Resnick, 306 P.2d at 5; TransAmerica, 789 P.2d at 26(whether observing the corporate 
form will sanction a fraud or an injustice "is addressed to the conscience of the court, and 
the circumstances under which it will be met will vary with each case.") 
The question of bad faith concerning Rice Inc., however, is purely factual, 
reviewed under a clear error standard. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah App. 
1991)("A finding of bad faith is a question of fact and is reviewed . . . under the 'clearly 
erroneous' standard"). See also State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah App. 
1993)("the quintessential factual question of intent predominates" the question of bad 
faith); Olympus Hills Or. Ltd v. Smith's Food, 889 P.2d 445, 452 (Utah App. 1994). 
In this case, the "[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. UTAH R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). That is so because "the findings of ultimate facts implicitly reflect consideration 
of the believability of the witnesses' testimony." McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 
1286, 1289 (Utah 1981). 
Issue 2. Whether it was error for the trial court to apply "closer scrutiny" to the 
alter ego claim because of the Trust's repeated, voluntary, contractual relationships with 
Rice Inc. and Rice LLC. 
Standard of Review: To the extent the trial court imposed a different or higher 
burden of proof on this issue—as opposed to simply according weight to a relevant 
factor—its decision is reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n., 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah 1996). We believe, however, that the trial court 
merely used the fact of the repeated voluntary contracts as an additional, though 
important, factor. When required to weigh competing factors, the trial court in its 
discretion may give more or less weight to one or more factors over the others based on 
the circumstances. That decision is reviewed for abuse. DJ. Investment Group v. 
DAE/Westbrook, 113 P.3d 1022, 1023 (Utah App. 2005). 
Issue 3. Whether the trial court erred when it declined to impose personal liability 
on Mr. Rice based on a theory of constructive fraud. 
Standard of Review: Constructive fraud requires a confidential relationship 
between the parties. The existence of a confidential relationship is a question of fact. 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). 
Issue 4. Whether the trial court erred when it declined to impose personal liability 
on Mr. Rice based on a breach of fiduciary duty theory, which in turn was based on Mr. 
Rice's role as president and primary owner of Rice Inc. and Rice LLC. 
Standard of Review: Because of the underlying factual questions concerning 
duties of loyalty and good faith, this issue presents a mixed question of law and fact. As 
such, the court "review[s] the underlying empirical facts under a deferential clear error 
standard " Drake v. Indus. Comm'n., 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). The "legal 
effect of those facts," however, "is the province of the appellate courts, and no deference 
need be given a trial court's resolution of such questions of law." State v. Vincent, 883 
P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994). 
On the subsidiary factual question at the heart of this issue, indeed much of the 
case—whether Mr. Rice engaged in self-dealing or bad faith—the standard is clear error. 
If challenged, the Trust "must marshal the evidence in support of the [trial court's] 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, [those] findings are so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly 
erroneous." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 94 P.3d 193, 203 (Utah 2004). 
This Court views the evidence from this bench trial "in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings " Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991). 
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when it is contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence, supporting a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Gen. 
Determination, 98 P.3d at 9. 
Issue 5. Whether the trial court erred when it exercised its discretion not to grant 
a new trial. 
Standard of review: A new trial is a matter for broad trial court discretion, 
reviewed for abuse. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This was an action by a limited partner, the Trust, against 
the general partners, Rice Inc. and Rice LLC, in two residential construction partnerships, 
one in California (Cherry Hills) and another in Utah (Bridlevale). The Trust obtained a 
judgment under certain claims, but not others. The Trust's central focus at trial was 
imposing personal liability on Mr. Rice. (R. 1692 at 4). The trial centered on three 
primary claims, each seeking the ultimate remedy of personal liability: alter ego liability 
and liability based on theories of fiduciary duty and constructive trust. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: The action was filed in November, 
1999. The Trust obtained summary judgment (unopposed) in July, 2003, against Rice 
Inc. and Rice LLC. because, as general partners, both entities are liable as a matter of law 
for the obligations of their respective partnerships. See Mariani v. Price Waterhouse, 70 
Cal.App.4 685 (1999)(general partner is liable for all partnership debts). Summary 
judgment on the alter ego claim was denied. 
The case was tried from September, 29 through October 3, 2003. Judge Noel 
issued a Memorandum Decision on March 4, 2004. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and final Judgment were entered on September 14, 2004. (R. 1355-1384). The trial 
court denied the Trust's Motion to Amend or for a New Trial. (R. 1163-65). The Trust 
timely appealed. (R. 1675-77). 
Statement of Facts: Mr. Rice and Mr. d'Elia first became business associates in 
1988 when Rice Inc. was the general partner and general contractor for a 335 home 
construction project known as Park Hill, in California. (R. 1357 ^ 7,8). Mr. d'Elia, the 
limited partner, purchased the land and contributed it to the partnership. Rice Inc. 
constructed the homes. Park Hill was extremely successful. Id. f 10. Mr. d'Elia and 
Rice Inc., and Mr. Rice, each made substantial profits. Id. In addition to its profit, Rice 
Inc. was paid a supervision fee equal to 3.75% of the sales price on each home to cover 
its own overhead during construction. (R. 1358 f 11). The project moved so fast, 
because homes sold so quickly, that Rice Inc. even made a profit on that supervision fee. 
(R. 1694 at 403-04). d'Elia was repaid his capital contribution via installments from 
home sales. Profits were split at the end of the project. Id. f 12. 
During construction at Park Hill, Rice Inc. determined that it needed to better 
assure the timeliness and quality of their framing, drywall and concrete subcontractors. 
(R. 1358 [^ 13). Eventually, Rymco Framing, Mycor Drywall and Jymco (concrete) were 
formed as "in-house" subcontractors. Their purpose was to allow Rice Inc. better control 
over quality and timeliness. Mr. d'Elia was informed of and consented to the 
arrangement. (R. 1358-591f 15). 
As Park Hill ended, the parties sought to duplicate their spectacular success with 
another, identical California partnership, called Old Mountain Road, consisting of 96 
homes. (R. 1359 % 19). This project was located next to and was essentially a 
continuation of Park Hill. Id. Rymco, Mycor and Jymco were the primary subs. Old 
Mountain was essentially identical to Park Hill. (R. 1360 f 20). Sales at Old Mountain 
were slower. Id.\2\. Mr. d'Elia broke even on that investment. (R. 1692 at 119). 
Just a year after Old Mountain was formed, in September, 1991, the parties again 
formed Cherry Hills, another virtually identical partnership, also in California. (R. 1360 
% 23-24). Cherry Hills and Old Mountain overlapped substantially. Id. % 24. The Trust 
loaned approximately $1 million to Cherry Hills for the construction of model homes. 
(R. 1361 f 29). At the same time, the southern California economy began a slide into 
severe recession. (R. 1361 | 30). In 1992, the parties realized that the poor economy, 
which translated to flat home sales, might kill the project. Id. f 30. Rice and d'Elia 
consulted and agreed to convert to less expensive "starter" homes. Id. The Trust made 
additional loans for more model homes. Id. 
The economy worsened, and sales at Cherry Hills remained flat. In June of 1993, 
the Trust agreed to reduce its per-house capital repayment. (R. 1362 | 31). Later, the 
Trust agreed to delay repayment until the end of the project, to forego interest payments 
and to defer repayment of the model home loans until the end of the project. Id. 
Worsening economic conditions forced Rice Inc. and the Trust to even consider shutting 
the project down. Id. Rice was in regular, frequent contact with Mr. d'Elia, providing 
construction and budget information and otherwise keeping him apprised of the status of 
Cherry Hills and Old Mountain. Id. % 32. To sustain Cherry Hills, Mr. Rice and Rice 
Inc. cuts costs dramatically. {See App. Brf. 48-49).l 
Rice Inc. was paid the same supervision fee (3.75%) at Cherry Hills as had been 
agreed on three years earlier at Park Hill. (R. 1363 f 34). The standard fee at the time 
was 5%. Id. Because of the poor sales at Cherry Hills, Rice Inc. waived its supervision 
fee. Id. During the Cherry Hills project, Mr. Rice received either salary or profit 
distributions from Rice Inc., (R. 1364 f 36), which came from the Park Hill profits. (R. 
1694 at 404). Nothing in the Cherry Hills partnership agreement provides that Mr. Rice's 
own money was at risk at Cherry Hills. Id. ^ 37. Instead, as the general contractor, Rice 
was to devote his time, effort and skill necessary to complete the project. (R. 1361 f 26). 
Mr. Rice stayed in regular contact with Mr. d'Elia, providing updates or status 
reports on the Old Mountain and Cherry Hills projects. He also visited Mr. d'Elia 
regularly at d'Elia9s Casper, Wyoming home. The Trust was sent regular updates on the 
sales and finances of Cherry Hills. (R. 1362-63 f 32-33). At the beginning of each 
phase, Mr. Rice sent the Trust the same pro formas used by the bank to monitor how the 
construction draws were being used. (R. 1363 f 33). 
1
 California Governor Gray Davis summarized his state's deep recession: 
The 1990's were both pivotal and paradoxical for California. The decade began 
with a severe economic slump and ended with a record-breaking expansion. The 
end of the Cold War led to significant reductions in federal defense spending— 
characterized by reduced procurement and base closures. This led to a major 
downsizing of the state's aerospace industry and reductions in Department of 
Defense payrolls. To make matters worse, the state was plagued with a series of 
natural and manmade disasters . . . . These factors resulted in a much longer and 
far deeper recession than the rest of the nation. 
Economic Report of the Governor: 2000, at 42. 
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At the beginning of the Cherry Hills Project, Rice Inc. obtained competitive bids 
from unrelated framing subcontractors to ensure that Rymco prices were consistent with 
market rates. The Cherry Hills and Bridlevale Agreements provide that Rice Inc. and 
Rice LLC are permitted contracts with affiliated entities "for any purpose or purposes in 
furtherance of the business of the Partnership," as long as the terms were on an "arms-
length" basis. (R. 1364138; Ex. l , f 6.3(a)). 
The plan for the in-house subcontractors was to ensure quality and timeliness, and 
not to make a profit. They were expected to more or less break even. (R. 1371 f^ 68). 
During construction at Cherry Hills, Rymco determined that it was losing money on its 
framing subcontracts with Rice Inc. (R. 1364 f 39). Rymco therefore increased its prices 
for framing Cherry Hills Homes by 30 to 38% for larger homes in order to recoup prior 
losses. Id. The prices were then lowered again. (R. 1371 f 68). 
Except for this period when prices were increased to make up for prior losses, the 
subcontracts with Rymco at Cherry Hills were at market prices, were arms-length and 
benefited the partnership. (R. 1371 f 68). The subcontracts were entered into so that 
Rice Inc. could maintain quality control over each project. Particularly with respect to 
Cherry Hills, quality control was critical. (R. 1371 \ 68). Rice Inc. produced a quality 
product. (App. Brf. 40-41; Ex. 183; Ex. 340(see appendix). 
As construction at Cherry Hills proceeded, Mr. Rice moved to Utah and with Mr. 
d'Elia formed Bridlevale for the construction of 108 homes in Salt Lake City. (R. 1366 f 
46). The Trust again purchased the land and donated it to the partnership. Rice LLC 
supervised construction. Id. f 48. The Bridlevale agreement is practically the same as 
Cherry Hills, Old Mountain and Park Hill, but with one significant exception: the 
Bridlevale agreement provides that capital would be returned to the Trust only at the end 
of the Bridlevale Project, after all of the Bridlevale homes were built and sold and 
expenses paid. (R. 1367 f 49; Ex. 31 f 4.8). 
During construction at Bridlevale, and in violation of the Bridlevale agreement, 
the Trust extracted payments on its return of capital, totaling more than $330,000, before 
the project was completed. (R. 1371 f^ 77). These payments were made at Mr. d'Elia's 
request to "accommodate his needs." (R. 1696 at 821). Over the years, as Mr. Rice and 
Mr. d'Elia continued to work together on these projects, "a rather loose environment 
regarding financial matters" developed between the Trust and Rice Inc. and Rice LLC. 
(R. 1374 f 76). A number of transactions in which the Trust was involved were not 
reduced to writing. Id. Substantial amounts of money were transferred between the Trust 
and Rice Inc. and Rice LLC, and Mr. Rice, without any formalities. Id. {See also Ex. 
342, Ex. 31, If 4.8, Ex. 102; Ex. 103; Ex. 182; Ex. 171). 
During the course of the Bridlevale Project, Mr. d'Elia informed Mr. Rice that the 
Trust had cash flow problems. (R. 1371 % 70). Mr d'Elia contacted Mr. Rice and asked 
for any available Bridlevale funds. Id. Nothing was then available, but Mr. Rice agreed 
to and did wire transfer $100,000 from his personal retirement account to Mr. d'Elia. Id. 
The Trust treated and recorded the transfer from Mr. Rice as a return of capital from 
Bridlevale. Id. Mr. d'Elia told Mr. Rice that Rice could repay himself from Bridlevale 
proceeds. Id. Mr. Rice declined. Id.; R. 1374 f 75. 
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The Trust was aware of and approved several inter-company loans between 
Cherry Hills and Bridlevale, and it was aware that related subcontractors were used at 
Cherry Hills and Bridlevale. Mr. Schmehr, counsel for the Trust, told d'Elia that the use 
of such subcontractors on a previous project may have been a breach of the Park Hill 
Agreement. Mr. d'Elia, however, already aware of the related subcontractors, was not 
concerned. (R. 1375 f 78). Mr. Rice caused other, similar loans involving entities in 
which the Trust had no ownership interest. (R. 1372 | 71-72). These loans were 
arranged on an as-needed basis to cover shortfalls at Cherry Hills or Bridlevale. Id. \ 72. 
Some were documented {See, e.g., Exs. 214, 215, 217-20), and many were not. While the 
Trust was aware of and approved several loans between Cherry Hills and Bridlevale, the 
Trust was not aware of all of the inter-company loans,, (R. 1372 f 72). Eventually, 
Bridlevale was over-repaid more than $85,000, while Cherry Hills was under-repaid 
approximately $58,000, for a net over-repayment of more than $27,000 more than what 
had been loaned by Cherry Hills and Bridlevale. (R. 1373 f 72-73; R. 1696 at 796). 
Although all 108 homes were built and sold, Bridlevale lost money due to early 
delays, including weather delays, and the problems with another partner, Bowler. (R. 
1368 f 52; 1367 f 51). As he had done at Cherry Hills, Mr. Rice caused Rice LLC to 
waive its supervision fee at Bridlevale to aid the project. Id. f 54. All 140 Cherry Hills 
homes were built and sold, but the project took six years to complete. (R. 1363 f 35). 
Rice Inc. and Rice LLC followed certain corporate formalities, and did not adhere 
to others. (R. 1375 f^ 79-80). Both were valid, properly formed entities (as were the 
related subcontractors), in good standing with their respective states. (See, e.g., Ex. at 27, 
.f 14.1(b); App. Brf. at 42 and n. 11 and 12). The entities kept separate, accurate books, 
records and finances, and filed separate tax returns. Id. Mr. Rice contributed $95,000 in 
personal funds to Cherry Hills and another $68,000 to Bridlevale. (R. 1374 % 75; Trust's 
Expert Report, attach. 8-b, 9-c). Added to the $100,000 paid directly to the Trust, Mr. 
Rice contributed personally at least $263,000. 
The supervision fees of 3.75 percent were at least 1% below market. (R. 1363 ^ 
34). The difference to Cherry Hills was $142,604, and to Bridlevale, $121,587. Rice Inc. 
and Rice LLC waived supervision fees at both projects, saving them a total of $230,000 
(See App. Brf. at 49). When the additional $100,000 paid by Mr. Rice directly to Mr. 
d'Elia is added, the total contribution to the projects by Mr. Rice, Rice Inc. and Rice LLC 
is $594,191. In addition, Mr. Rice, Rice Inc. and Rice LLC paid an undetermined 
amount of the costs to finish Cherry Hills and Bridlevale. (R. 1693 at 290, 293; 1374 f 
75). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Whether to impose alter ego liability—a harsh remedy reluctantly used—is as 
fact-sensitive as a question can be. Only the broadest of rules govern, which turn on the 
unique facts of every case. The decision is grounded in equity, requiring the court to 
weigh the conduct of both parties, with the aim of undoing or preventing a fraud or 
injustice caused by the self-serving or bad faith misuse of the corporate form. The trial 
court accomplished that task, recognizing that the Trust had itself engaged in or 
authorized the very kind of conduct it used to invoke the remedy. Having conceded the 
underlying facts, including its complicity in the very informalities it complains of now, 
the Trust is left with only a challenge to the "conscience of the court." 
The trial court properly considered the fact that Mr. d'Elia and the Trust 
contracted with Rice four separate times, the first of which resulted in spectacular profits 
and was the motivation for the subsequent agreements. The fact that the Trust sought to 
pierce the corporate veil in the two transactions where it lost money made its voluntary 
contractual relationship all the more relevant. 
The Trust's constructive fraud theory for personal liability against Mr. Rice falters 
also, first because there is no factual predicate—neither a claim below nor an argument 
here—that Mr. d'Elia relinquished his will or was otherwise dominated by the will of Mr. 
Rice. To the contrary, the unchallenged facts demonstrate that far from abandoning his 
decision-making ability, or having it taken from him, Mr. d'Elia exercised significant 
authority in both partnerships, including taking improper returns of capital, extracting 
consulting fees he admits were a cover for a quick return on his investment, ordering or 
authorizing cash transfers among entities and otherwise actively participating in 
managerial decisions. 
Furthermore, Mr. Rice volunteered hundreds of thousands of dollars in personal 
funds to assist both projects. He also caused Rice Inc. and Rice LLC to take discounted 
supervision fees and then to waive the fee altogether. Mr. Rice did not self-deal or 
otherwise benefit at the expense of either the Trust or the partnerships, demonstrating that 
he did not impose a self-serving will on Mr. d'Elia or the Trust. Without a confidential 
relationship—a factual question on which the Trust did not prevail—in which Mr. d'Elia 
was all but powerless, constructive fraud is not available as a basis for personal liability. 
For these same reasons, neither can the Trust recover losses by imposing personal 
liability under a breach of fiduciary duty theory. Mr. Rice took no unfair advantage. Far 
from self-dealing, he in fact subordinated his self-interest to that of the partnerships by, 
among other things, paying substantial personal funds into both partnerships and directly 
to the Trust. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CONSIDERING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE OVER FIVE DAYS AND FROM 
SEVERAL WITNESSES AND HUNDREDS OF EXHIBITS, THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION NOT TO IMPOSE ALTER EGO LIABILITY IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.2 
A. The nature and purpose of the corporate form and the trial court's 
advantaged position regarding the evidence warrants substantial 
deference to the decision not to invoke alter ego liability. 
The corporate form is "a pillar of American law." United Electrical, etc. v. 163 
Pleasant Street Corporation, 960 F.2d 1080, 1091 (1st Cir. 1992). Sound policy supports 
corporation-stockholder separation: "commerce and industrial growth" are promoted by 
encouraging "capital contributions." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 
Just like shareholders, managers and members of an LLC are not liable for company 
obligations. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2C-601. The law in this area is developing, but 
"most commentators assume that the doctrine [of alter ego] applies to limited liability 
companies." Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F.Supp. 1320, 1335 (D. Utah 1997)(citations 
omitted). Accordingly the discussion, though couched in the language of corporations, 
applies to Rice LLC. 
P.2d 42, 46, n.9 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 
Willamette L.Rev. 371, 371 (1981).3 
"A defining feature of a corporation is the limitation of the liability of the 
individuals involved to the sums voluntarily contributed." Miller v. Celebration Mining 
Co., 29 P.3d 1231, 1237 (Utah 2001). "[Corporate veils exist for a reason and should be 
pierced only reluctantly and cautiously. The law permits the incorporation of businesses 
for the very purpose of isolating liabilities among separate entities." Cascade Energy, 
896 F.2d at 1576. See also Shafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah App. 
1994)(the corporate veil is pierced only "reluctantly and cautiously.")4 See also 1 
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 41.10 (Rev. Vol. 1974), G. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 146 at 347 (1983) ("limited liability is one of the principal objectives 
of incorporation"). 
The corporate form can be used for fraudulent or self-serving ends. There was no 
fraud in this case, however, (R. 1377 f 5, 6; 1380 f 17), and there is no injustice in 
acknowledging the corporate existence of Rice Inc. when the only harm the Trust can 
The limited liability provided by incorporation promotes entrepreneurial activity and 
economic growth by allowing investment in a corporation without also exposing personal 
assets to the risk of failure. Incorporation Risks: Defective Incorporation and Piercing 
the Corporate Veil in California, 12 Pac. LJ. 829 (1981). See James Constructors, 761 
P.2d at 46("Courts must balance piercing and insulating policies and will only reluctantly 
and cautiously pierce the corporate veil."). 
4
 "The corporate structure is an artificial construct of the law, a substantial purpose of 
which is to create an incentive for investment by limiting exposure to personal liability. 
'The insulation of a stockholder from the debts and obligations of his corporation is the 
norm, not the exception.'" N.L.R.B. v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1051 
(10th Cir. 1993), quoting NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc.t 361 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1960). 
"[PJiercing the corporate veil is an exception reserved for extreme situations . . ." 
Trustees of Nat Elevator Ind. v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 197 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
demonstrate is that it is an unsatisfied creditor. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 9 
Cal.App. 4th 1205, 1212 (1992). As we demonstrate below, the facts show that Mr. Rice 
did not enrich himself at either the Trust's or the partnerships' expense. And just as 
importantly, there is no finding of bad faith. 
Grounded in equity, the decision whether to pierce is as fact-sensitive as any 
question can be, ultimately left to the "conscience of the [trial] court." Transamerica, 
789 P.2d at 26. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec, 657 P.2d 
1312, 1316-17 (Utah 1982)(phrase "equity and good conscience" confers broad 
discretion). The record must "compel" a different result on appeal. Arthur v. Chournos, 
574 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1978), citing Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, Sec. 9. 
Ignoring the corporation is an extraordinary remedy, generally requiring 
extraordinary evidence. See American Bell, 736 F.2d at 886 (piercing the corporate veil 
has "demanding" requirements to be applied only in "specific, unusual circumstances"). 
See also Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 539 
(2000)("Alter ego is an extreme remedy, sparingly used."). Liability turns on varying 
factors, allowing the court to reach those who "misus[ed] the corporate laws by the 
device of a sham corporation." Id. at 538. 
The Court should keep two overarching elements in mind: First, to justify 
ignoring it, the corporate form must be "used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, 
or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose . . . ." Sonora Diamond, 83 
Cal .App^ at 538. Alter ego, literally "second self," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 77 (6th 
ed. 1990), means that "a principal shareholder or owner conducts his private and 
corporate business on an interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one . . . ." 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 786. The facts must "enable the courts to see clearly that the 
corporate entity is but a sham and it is the stockholder who is doing business behind the 
corporate shield." Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973)(emphasis added) 
Second, its foundation in equity means that "alter ego is not made to depend upon 
prior decisions involving [similar] factual situations . . . ." Instead, it varies "according to 
the circumstances of each case." Las Palmas Assoc, v. Las Palmas Center Assoc, 235 
Cal.App.3d 1220, 1228 (1991). See also Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 26(same). 
Accordingly, alter ego is subject to equity defenses. Alexander v. Abbey of Chimes, 104 
Cal.App.3d39 (1980). ..... 
"The law as to whether courts will pierce the corporate veil is easy to state and 
difficult to apply." Las Palmas, 235 Cal.App.3d at 1228. This Court can read the "cold 
record" and evaluate the evidence, which on questions of equity is its right, but it cannot 
see the witnesses testify. Trial courts deserve deference fact and "conscience" driven 
issue "because they are in an advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and determine 
the facts." State v. Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108 (Utah 2000). Demeanor, tone, sincerity or the 
lack of it are exclusively for the trial court as it weighs the evidence against the many 
alter ego factors. 
The Trust claims not to dispute the facts. (App. Brf. 1, 25). It argues that the trial 
court mis-weighed the evidence because some evidence supports its theories. 
"Evaluating conflicting testimony is the proper role of the finder of fact. When an 
appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the lower court's findings of 
fact, [the appellate] court "do[es] not weigh the evidence de novo." Hogle v. Zinetics 
Medical Inc., 63 P.3d 80, 85 (Utah 2002). 
Thus, the Trust may not "merely re-argue the factual case [it] presented in the trial 
court." Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (Utah 2004). Arguing that the weight of 
the evidence favors an opposite result "is nothing but an attempt to have [the appellate 
court] substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on a contested factual issue. This 
[the court] cannot do " Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 561 (Utah App. 2003), cert 
denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). 
B. The Trust fails to marshal all of the evidence in support of the decision 
not to impose alter ego liability. 
1. The partnership agreements: An omitted but centrally important piece of 
evidence consists of the terms of the Cherry Hills and Bridlevale agreements. For 
example, both agreements provide that the general partner (Rice Inc. and Rice LLC) had 
wide discretion to operate the partnerships and act for their best interests. (Ex. 1 at 11, et 
seq.\ Ex. 31 at 11, et seq). Mr. d'Elia conceded this fact. (R. 1692 at 128). The 
corollary is that Rice Inc. and Rice LLC are protected against poor judgment. Liability is 
based only on "gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct of the person in 
question:' (Ex. 1 at 26,112.1; Ex. 31 at 25112.1)(emphasis added).5 
This agreed standard assisted the trial court in deciding the level of culpable 
conduct necessary to impose liability on Rice Inc. and Rice LLC, before even reaching 
the alter ego question. This evidence is not marshaled. 
"Person" is defined in the partnership agreements as "any individual, corporation, 
partnership, trust or other entity." (Ex. 1 at 29 f 15.8; 31 at 28 \ 15.8). 
2. The extent of the Trust's participation in the "loose environment 
regarding financial matters." The Trust fails to marshal the evidence of the depth of its 
complicity in the financial transactions between the partnerships and among the various 
entities. Exhibit 171, for example, shows that, in addition to the $30,000 transfer from 
Cherry Hills the Trust admits authorizing, nearly $150,000 additional was loaned with the 
Trust's approval by Cherry Hills to Bridlevale to purchase the Bridlevale land. 
The Trust concedes that it violated the Bridlevale agreement when it took capital 
repayments prior to project completion. (App. Brf. 51; See also R. 1374 f 77; Ex. 31 TJ 
4.8). Yet, so accustomed was the Trust to these improper payments that Mr. d'Elia was 
angry when this cash flow ran dry: 
Towards the end of the Bridal Veil [sic] project when there were still 
homes being sold and escrow being closed, and there were no funds coming 
my way, I got a little bit upset about it. I called Mr. Rice and asked him 
what was going on and when was the next payment. 
(R. 1692 at 147). 
This testimony was not an answer to the question of whether or when the Trust 
was to receive its next Bridlevale installment. This responded to the question of whether 
Mr. d'Elia ever had any "cause for complaint about access to information" concerning the 
projects. (R. 1692 at 146). His complaint was not that he could not get information—he 
concedes that he did, whenever he needed it. Id. His complaint was that money, which 
was not owed and the payment of which violated the Bridlevale agreement, was not 
available the moment he needed it. (R. 1692 at 147). These capital repayments were 
made at Mr. d'Elia's request when he had a "cash flow problem or need[ed] money" to 
"accomodate] his needs " (R. 1696 at 821). 
That fact, omitted in the Trust's marshalling effort, leads to another fact the Trust 
understandably downplays: What drove Mr. d'Elia's investments was cash flow. (R. 
1692 at 106-07). When personal cash flow ran tight in 1997, Mr. d'Elia asked for 
another installment from Bridlevale. Because there was at that moment no money 
available, Mr. Rice offered and sent $100,000 from his own retirement fund. d'Elia 
accepted. (App. Brf. 54; R. 1371 f 70). 
What is most telling, and the point glossed over by the Trust, is that Mr. d'Elia 
instructed Mr. Rice to repay himself from Bridlevale funds. Id.; R. 1692 at 160. 
Moreover, d'Elia could not wait for Bridlevale funds to arrive; he had made 
"commitments" (R. 1692 at 158) that had nothing to do with Bridlevale and that overrode 
the terms of the Bridlevale agreement. "Q. You needed the money. You didn't care 
where it came from? A. That is correct." (R. 1692 at 160). 
One could argue, as the Trust implicitly does, that the repayment order did not 
matter, because the Bridlevale money would have been sent at Mr. d'Elia's request 
anyway. The problem, however, is that the transaction not only violated the Bridlevale 
agreement (App. Brf. 51), it also illustrates the concept of expediency, the very concept 
that Mr. Rice explained when describing the nature and purpose of the inter-company 
loans (discussed below). 
A number of material transactions in both projects were handled informally—three 
and a quarter million dollars worth—without so much as a confirming letter. This, 
despite the fact that substantive changes to the agreements must be written. (Ex. 1 at 26, 
TI 13.2; Ex. 31 at f^ 13.2). These transactions were merely expedient. The Trust fails to 
marshal all of the evidence of the Trust's willingness to overlook formalities: (1) capital 
repayment from Bridlevale, $334,3136*; (2) Bowler buyout, $103,000; (3) Cherry Hills 
model loan #1, $340,0007; (4) Cherry Hills model loan #2, $713,0008; (5) Agreement to 
defer capital return, $1,500,0009; (6) Agreement to defer loan repay; (7) transfer 
from Old Mountain to Bridlevale, $30,000; (8) Rice wire transfer, $100,00010; (9) 
d'Elia's instruction of repayment from Bridlevale funds; (10) transfer from Cherry Hills 
to Bridlevale, $146,771n. These informalities, deemed expedient by the Trust, total 
$3,267,000. 
Asked why his model home loans to Cherry Hills were not in writing, Mr. d'Elia 
stated blithely only that "[w]e weren't into promissory notes." (R. 1692 at 127). This, 
from someone complaining about a lack of formalities. The Trust omits this evidence. 
The trial court focused on it, ruling that the Trust could not abandon formalities when 
convenient only to invoke them later to look to Mr. Rice for repayment. (R. 1377 f 4). 
The Trust marshals some of the evidence concerning Mr. d'Elia's "consulting 
agreement" with Cherry Hills. (App. Brf. at 53-54). Capital returns from Cherry Hills 
were permitted only when houses actually sold. (Ex. 1 f 5.9; R. 1361 f 27). Impatient 
6Def.Ex.342 
*Pltf.Ex.31,f4.8,p.7 
7Pltf.Ex. 102 
8Pltf.Ex. 102 
9
 Pltf. Ex. 103 
10Def.Ex. 182 
HDef. Ex. 171 
with that formality, Mr. d'Elia created the fiction of a consulting agreement paying him 
$240,000 within the first year of Cherry Hills' existence. {See Ex. 127; Ex. 169 at 3 f 4). 
That up-front obligation to Mr. d'Elia for doing nothing (1) circumvented the partnership 
agreement and (2) subordinated the partnership's interests to Mr. d'Elia's demand for a 
quick return, (R. 1692 at 149-50), the "cash flow" of which he was so fond. (R. 1692 at 
106-07). These unearned consulting fees represented an advance partnership obligation 
to Mr. d'Elia equal to twelve homes before one was even built. 
The Trust contends that the consulting fee was never paid. (App. Brf. 54). That is 
not what Mr. d'Elia said. This is his testimony: 
Q. I think you said on direct that that consulting fee money was never 
paid to you. 
A. It was never paid to me. 
Q. Are you sure now? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. When I asked you in your deposition, you said that it had been paid. 
A. No way. 
Q. Turn to page 145. 
A. Yes, I did receive $240,000, which was applied to reducing the 
amount of capital 
Q. Yes. 
A. That was not $240,0001 had been promised in consultant's fee. 
Q. . . . you got $240,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. . . . you just applied it as a return of capital. 
A. Yes. I believe that is what my ledgers show. 
(R. 1692 at 150-51)(emphasis added). 
This evidence was not marshaled, to say nothing of what it did to Mr. d'Elia's 
credibility. 
Mr. d'Elia offered a further revealing admission about the consulting fees he knew 
Cherry Hills could not afford but which he knew he had the power to extract. After he 
admitted that no houses could have been sold in time to cover those fees, this exchange 
ensued: 
Mr. d'Elia: [Cherry Hills] would have been able to make a land draw from 
the bank and also construction loans from the bank, and so that was 
probably the source that we were looking at for those payments. 
Q. The purpose of this [consulting] contract, wasn't it, was to find a 
way to get—provide you a quick return on your capital investment of $2.4 
million? 
A. Yeah, I guess that was the idea behind it. 
Q. The amount of $240,000 is 10 percent? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you thought it was appropriate that the partnership borrow that 
money to pay you . . . this 10 percent? 
A. Absolutely. It was successful enough. 
(R. 1692 at 149-50)(emphasis added). See also Ex. 127. 
"Successful enough" Cherry Hills had not yet built a single home. The Trust 
failed to marshal this evidence. 
Asked about the formation and use of the related "in-house" subcontractors at the 
very successful Park Hill project, Mr. d'Elia's answer demonstrates that he ignored 
formalities when expedient: 
I don't think that Mr. Schmear [d'Elia's attorney] was aware that Mr. 
Young had talked to me about [the formation and use of the related 
subcontractors], and so Mr. Schmear was very upset over it because he felt 
it was a breach of contract. . . on the general contractor's part. I told Mr. 
Schmear, I said, "Don't worry about it. This has been a money making 
project. Everybody has done fantastically well. Everybody is happy, and 
so they made a few bucks on the side. What's the big deal." 
(R. 1692 at 11 l-12)(emphasis added). 
The Trust marshals the first part of this answer—that Schmear believed the related 
subs constituted a breach. It omits the more important second part, which reveals Mr. 
d'Elia's own thinking, not to mention misunderstanding, about the related subcontractors. 
He thought they were making money from the projects "on the side," as though they were 
not under contract. And that did not bother him. They of course were under contract, and 
the trial court found, and the Trust does not dispute, that those contracts were arms-length 
and fair. (R. 1371 f^ 68-69; App. Brf. 25). What matters here, and what mattered to the 
trial court, was Mr. d'Elia's cavalier attitude about formalities he claims are so important. 
This evidence of expedience permeated the trial, informing the correct conclusion 
that 
A plaintiff seeking the equitable remedy of alter ego must come to court 
with clean hands in order to prevail. It would be inequitable to allow the 
Trust during prosperous times to participate in and sanction certain 
informalities in the manner in which the parties did business, but when 
substantial losses occur, rely on those informalities as a means to pierce the 
corporate veil. 
(R. 1377114). 
These are the kind of facts that give a case a look and feel that cannot be replicated 
in these pages or the trial transcript. This is the kind of evidence that informs "the 
conscience the court" in deciding the alter ego issue. 
3. Contributions to the projects by Rice Inc., Rice LLC and Mr. Rice. The 
Trust marshals some of the evidence of Rice's direct financial contributions and 
concessions to both Cherry Hills and Bridlevale. (App. Brf. 48-50). Taken together, the 
contributions by Rice Inc., Rice LLC and Mr. Rice, including concessions on unpaid 
supervision fees and Rice's agreement to accept at least 1% below market, total more 
11 than $600,000. The Trust omits this cumulative evidence. 
4. Undercapitalization. "[T]he inquiry into corporate capitalization is most 
relevant for the inference it provides into whether the corporation was established to 
defraud its creditors or other improper purpose such as avoiding the risks known to be 
attendant to a type of business:' Trustees, etc. v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188,197 (3rd Cir. 2003), 
citing FLETCHER, § 41.33(emphasis added). The proponent of alter ego liability must 
demonstrate "that the financial setup of the corporation is only a sham and causes an 
12
 That calculation is as follows: The supervision fees of 3.75 percent were at least 1% 
below market. (R. 1363, 1368 f 34, 54). The difference at Cherry Hills was $142,604, 
and at Bridlevale $121,587. Add to that the amount of the unpaid supervision fees at 
both projects, $230,000 (See App. Brf. at 49), plus the $100,000 paid directly by Mr. Rice 
to Mr. d'Elia (R. 1371 f 70), and the total is $594,191. In addition, Rice Inc. paid an 
undetermined amount of the costs to finish the beleaguered Cherry Hills project, and Rice 
LLC contributed cash to finish Bridlevale. (R. 1693 at 290, 293). In addition, Mr. Rice 
contributed additional personal funds to both projects to assist when cash flow was 
insufficient. (R. 13741f 75). 
injustice." he Nantan Bogawa, Ltd, v. Scalia, 577 P.2d 725 (Ariz. App. 1978). See also 
Sonora Diamond, 83 Cal.App.4th at 538; Dockstader, 510 P.2d at 528. 
Plainly, capitalization issues turn in large part on the kind of industry in which the 
entity engages. Rice Inc. and Rice LLC were small, closely held construction companies. 
Both had general construction liability and workman's compensation insurance to cover 
their most likely exposure. (R. 1693 at 286-87). 
The Trust's theory on capitalization—because Rice Inc. and Rice LLC were 
unable to pay the partnership obligations owed the Trust (such as the model home 
loans)—suffers from two flaws, one theoretical and the other practical. First, as small, 
closely held construction companies neither could nor would be expected to keep large 
sums of cash stored in the event the construction projects failed. That is simply not how 
such entities operate. 
They were not, in other words, insurers of the Trust's investments. If the projects 
had failed, the construction lenders would have looked to the real property securing the 
construction loans. Second, the Trust overlooks the fact that cash flow for both Rice Inc. 
and Rice LLC—their very existence—depended on their respective supervision fees from 
the projects themselves to cover their own overhead. (R. 1693 at 283, 320; R. 1368 ffi[ 
34,54). 
Even if Rice Inc. and Rice LLC had received all the supervision fees they were 
entitled to (fees they waived to aid the cash-strapped partnerships), there was still not 
enough to pay, for example, the Trust's model home loans to Cherry Hills, and that 
assumes they could spend those fees to cover overhead. Those loans total more than two 
million dollars. (App. Brf. at 5). The supervision fee at Cherry Hills totaled $634,767. 
(R. 1363 f 34; 1368 f 54). To satisfy the Trust, Rice Inc. would have to save every dollar 
of revenue from prior projects—profits (if any) and supervision fees—to satisfy these 
unrealistic capitalization requirements. 
II. T H E TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE EVIDENCE TO THE 
NUMEROUS ALTER EGO FACTORS IN DECIDING NOT TO IMPOSE THAT 
REMEDY. 
A. Substantial evidence supports the trial court decision. 
Although the Trust fails to marshal all of the evidence, what it does marshal is 
substantial. The Trust concedes that the marshaled evidence supports the ruling. (App. 
Brf. at 55-56). That is sufficient. Colman, 743 P.2d at 787. It claims that the evidence 
was viewed in a "vacuum/' apparently to the exclusion of other evidence. (App. Brf. 56). 
This amounts to an argument that the trial court failed to accord the Trust's preferred 
weight to the Trust's preferred evidence. 
This misperception is likely the result of the Trust's insistence on a less 
deferential, but incorrect, standard of review. The Trust minimizes the fact-centered and 
equity-driven alter ego analysis. It is the "conscience of the court" aspect of that analysis 
that seems lost on the Trust. See Transamerica Cash Reserve, 789 P.2d at 26. 
The Trust concedes that the various entities observed and were separated by many 
formalities (proper formation, separate books, records, taxes etc.) (App. Brf. 42, 56). It 
concedes that Mr. Rice several times "placed the limited partner's interest ahead of the 
general partner's . . . ." Id. The Trust claims "corporate abuse," id., but it cannot point to 
any finding of bad faith or self-dealing. The trial court examined Mr. Rice's 
"distributions" (payments to himself) (See App. Brf. at 69). There was no finding of bad 
faith or self-dealing because the money Mr. Rice received actually belonged to him—it 
was earned. (R. 1377 U 6; 1694 at 404; 1696 at 859-60). 
The Trust's real argument is about equity, where the trial court's discretion to 
weigh the evidence is at its greatest. Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495, 505 (Utah 
2005)("In cases of equity, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error[] 
and accord significant deference to the court's balancing of the facts and 
equities")(citations omitted). 
B. There is no finding that Mr. Rice "siphoned" money from Rice Inc. or 
Rice LLC. 
In this case, the question is whether Mr. Rice should be liable for the debts of Rice 
Inc. and Rice LLC where the record (1) is void of any finding that Mr. Rice benefited 
personally at the Trust's or either partnerships' expense, (2) demonstrates that Mr. Rice 
contributed substantial personal funds to the projects, and (3) both Rice Inc. and Rice 
LLC also contributed money and waived already discounted fees to the projects at Mr. 
Rice's direction. 
The Trust relies on cases involving "siphoned" funds, and "secret profits." (App. 
Brf. at 28-29, citing inter alia Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 567 (N.D. 1985). In 
Jablonsky alter ego liability was affirmed because, among other things, the individual 
was "siphoning" money and the corporation was "merely a fa9ade" for personal 
transactions. The corporation was "only being used to justify a wrong " Id. at 563. 
Not only is there no finding of "siphoning" of funds—as opposed to lawful 
distributions—Mr. Rice contributed to the projects at least $260,000 of his own money. 
(R.1374 75). The Trust relies on Mr. Rice's distributions from Rice Inc., Rice LLC and 
Rymco. But the Trust fails to consider the undisputed evidence about the source of that 
money. In the early 1990s, those distributions were from the substantial profits made at 
Park Hill. (R. 1694 at 403). Those profits "sustained [Rice Inc.] for a long time." Id. at 
404. When Rice Inc. waived its supervision fee at Cherry Hills, Mr. Rice used his own 
money to keep it going to finish the projects. Id. 
The same is true for early 1990's distributions from Rymco. It, too, made a profit 
at Park Hill. Id. at 404-05. The Trust also claims that late 1990s distributions from 
Rymco show Mr. Rice profiting at Bridlevale's (or the Trust's) expense. The Trust 
marshals and then ignores the evidence that Rymco was framing "many" other jobs at 
that same time. Id. at 405. It was "doing tract [home] work," as well as other projects. 
Id. See also R.1696 at 859-60(Rymco was framing several projects at the time of the 
distributions). 
Despite the Trust's determined effort at trial, there is no finding at all that Mr. 
Rice profited at the expense of the partnerships or the Trust. It is undisputed that Rice 
contributed personal funds, and took a discounted supervision fee (R. 1363 f 34; 1368 \ 
54), and later waived that fee to aid both projects, id., and caused the inter-company 
loans to be over-repaid (net) to Cherry Hills and Bridlvale by $27,000. (R. 1373 \ 72-73; 
1696 at 796). 
If Mr. Rice is under the Trust's argument to shoulder the blame for every cent not 
accounted for, then he is under the same theory entitled to credit for the undisputed fact 
that every penny loaned by Cherry Hills and Bridlevale was, on balance, repaid, with the 
functional equivalent of interest because of the net over-repayment. (R. 1373 f 72-73). 
And he is entitled to credit for the unchallenged finding that the partnerships were not 
harmed. (R. 1377 f 5; App. Brf. at 61, n.17). 
The Trust even claims that, "[h]ad Mr. Rice left this capital [funds he had paid 
•himself from Rice Inc.] there would have been funds to repay Rice Inc.'s capital deficit in 
Cherry Hills, and Cherry Hills would have been able to repay the Trust its capital 
contributions and/or loans." (App. Brf. at 59). With regard to the capital contributions 
and loans (which were effectively converted to contributions when the Trust agreed to 
defer repayment until the end of Cherry Hills), the partnership agreements refute this 
claim directly. Both provide that "[t]he Limited Partner will look solely to the assets of 
the Partnership for the return of its Capital Contributions . . . [and has] no recourse 
against [Rice Inc.]." (Ex. 1 at 25, f 11.5)(emphasis added). This evidence is not 
marshaled. 
C. The closely held nature of Rice Inc. and Rice LLC requires an emphasis 
on the element of bad faith. 
Alter ego liability "affords protection where some conduct amounting to bad faith 
makes it inequitable for the corporate owner to hide behind the corporate form." Sonora 
Diamond, 83 Cal.App. 4 at 539. Inequity or unfairness does not mean merely a failed 
investment or unpaid debts. "In almost every instance where a plaintiff has attempted to 
invoke the [alter ego] doctrine he is an unsatisfied creditor." Mid-Century Ins., 9 
Cal.App.4thatl213. 
The emphasis on undoing or preventing bad-faith or fraud minimizes the emphasis 
on questions of capitalization or control: "The courts have cautioned against relying too 
heavily in isolation on the factors of inadequate capitalization or concentration of 
ownership and control." Id. 
This is particularly applicable when a close corporation like Rice Inc. is involved. 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 158. The close corporation is an intimate relationship between 
ownership and management—typically they are the same people. See Fama, et al., 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. Law & Econ. 301 (1983). Close 
corporations emphasize "simplified and informal procedures." CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 
(legislative committee comments). See also Hewitson v. Hewitson, 142 Cal.App.3d 874, 
881 (1983)(defining close corporation); Aurora Credit Serv. v. Liberty West, 970 P.2d 
1273,1280-81 (Utah 1998)(characteristics of close corporations). 
A doctrine that easily imposes personal liability on the owners of close 
corporations is not readily distinguishable from strict liability. As such, this basis for 
liability does more than merely undermine the purpose of incorporating the small 
business; it threatens extinction. 
D. The inter-company loans are not a basis for imposing alter ego liability. 
In Sonora Diamond, a parent corporation's loans to its subsidiary were not a basis 
on which to pierce. None of the loans "were shown to have been made with a fraudulent 
or deceptive intent." 83 Cal.App.4 at 539. They were not used to benefit the parent or 
for purposes harmful to the plaintiff. 
That is precisely the case here. There is no evidence of any fraudulent use of these 
inter-company loans, and the trial court expressly found (1) no fraud (R. 1380-81 f 17) 
and (2) that the loans caused no harm. (R. 1377 f 5; App. Brf. at 61, n. 17). They were 
used to keep the projects afloat by bridging the gap between payables due and the receipt 
of bank construction draws. (R. 1372 f 72; R.1693 at 304). Consistent with and in 
support of the trial court's finding that the loans caused no harm—a finding the Trust 
concedes (App. Brf. at 1, 61, n.17)—the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Rice (1) allowed 
the loans for the best interests of the partnerships and (2) did not personally benefit by 
them. (R. 1693 at 304; R. 1373 \ 72-73; 1371 U 70; 1377 % 5; 1377-78 H 6). 
Used to cover short term cash deficiencies (R. 1372 f^ 72), Mr. Rice explained that 
these loans 
saved the project - the interest from the bank loan. It kept money in our 
bank accounts to do the things that we did separately. It just was a good 
use of funds. 
Q. No interest was charged on these inter-company loans. Why not? 
A. Well, that was part of the - part of the deal. There was no reason 
for interest. They were short term loans, and . . . there was no need to 
pay interest. It would not have helped the project. 
(R. 1693 at 304). See also R. 1693 at 304 and 308-09 (describing examples of 
documented short term loans, repaid when construction draws arrived). 
Mr. d'Elia favored this method, because "he didn't have to put up money, and he 
didn't like borrowing money from banks . . . . " Id. at 305; see also R. 1692 at 127 (d'Elia 
ACor\e*-* 
testimony). See also R. 1373 % 72(Trust "was aware of and approved of several loans 
between Cherry Hills and Bridlevale"). This latter fact is confirmed by Mr. d'Elia's 
decision to accept $100,000 from Mr. Rice personally, followed by his instruction that 
Rice repay himself from Bridlevale funds. (R. 1371 f^ 70). Unorthodox though they 
were, the loans allowed the two partnerships to remain current with creditors, saving 
interest charges for both. (R. 1693 at 304). Cherry Hills could not have been completed 
without borrowing from somewhere, or receiving additional contributions from the 
partners. (R. 1693 at 305-06). 
E. There is no finding of bad faith and no challenge on that issue by the 
Trust. 
These loans are a convenient point to discuss the required element of bad faith. 
"To establish bad faith, one or more of the following must be lacking: 
(1) An honest belief in the proprieties of the activities in question; (2) no 
intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, [sic] hinder, delay 
or defraud others. 
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993). 
The Trust fails utterly to take on this essential element. The facts demonstrate 
Rice's "honest belief," thanks in part to the Trust's own approval of and participation in 
the very kind of inter-company loans and informalities it now offers as the basis for alter 
ego liability. The loans were expedient, just like the informalities Mr. d'Elia ordered. 
Not only does the evidence demonstrate no "intent" to take unfair advantage, it shows 
that Rice in fact did not take unfair advantage. Far from gaining anything from the loans, 
he contributed substantial personal funds to the projects—he was in effect one of the 
lenders, and like the Trust remains unpaid (R. 1374 f 75)—to say nothing of the 
supervision fees he first discounted and then waived. 
The Trust contends that when Mr. Rice permitted loans, which were used for valid 
partnership purposes (see, e.g., R. 1693 at 304), and which were repaid (R. 1372-73 Tj 72-
73), he should be held personally liable for all the Trust's losses. Yet the trial court 
found and the Trust does not dispute that the repaid loans caused no harm to either of the 
partnerships. (R. 1377 \ 5; App. Brf. at 61, n.17). Mr. d'Elia denied knowing about all 
of the loans, but he admits authorizing some and that he preferred not paying interest, (R. 
1692 at 127); neither was he "into" such formalities as promissory notes. (R. 1692 at 
127). 
The Trust contends that the over-repayment of the loans from Cherry Hills and 
Bridlevale is meaningless because Cherry Hills is owed interest on those loans, and 
further that the over-repayment benefited Bridlevale only. (App. Brf. at 61-62). Here, 
the Trust forgets the unchallenged fact that it treated Cherry Hills and Bridlevale as one 
when convenient. (R. 1377 f 4; R. 1375 f 78). The Trust cannot now insist on a 
distinction in theory that it never recognized in fact. The Trust's own treatment of these 
entities, and the others such as Old Mountain, established a business pattern that was part 
of the equities the trial court was required to consider when evaluating this most equitable 
of remedies. 
The Trust refers to Mr. Rice as "the hub in a wheel of cash" flowing among 
various entities and that his actions "advanced his own interests." (App. Brf. at 62). If 
there was such a "hub," the Trust was part of it (R. 1377 f 4; R. 1375 \ 78), and there is 
absolutely no finding that Mr. Rice acted for his own interests. This back door challenge 
to the facts does not relieve the Trust of its marshaling obligation. 
F. The Trust failed to establish a causal link between its claims against Mr. 
Rice and its losses. 
Alter ego liability is designed "to prevent the legal separation between the 
corporation and the controlling shareholder or shareholders from being used to 
perpetuate an injustice on third parties." TransAmerica, 789 P.2d at 26 (emphasis 
added). As an "equitable" remedy, Norman, 596 P.2d at 1032, alter ego is not "legal" 
liability; it instead prevents the "fundamental unfairness [that] will result from a failure to 
disregard the corporate form." See, generally, FLETCHER, § 41.25. 
In other words, the corporate form must itself be "used . . . to confuse or deceive, 
[such] that there is basic unfairness, something akin to fraud or deception which thus 
placed [a party] at a disadvantage and worked an injustice." Centurian Corp., 562 P.2d 
at 1253.13 
Cascade Energy illustrates. There the court found that even though there was 
commingling of funds among the various entities, all parties knew they were separate 
entities and de jure formation requirements were met. 896 F.2d at 1578. Furthermore, the 
claimants failed to show how their injuries were connected with the entities' 
"Alter ego] is available only if it is also shown that a corporation's affairs and 
personnel were manipulated to such an extent that it became nothing more than a sham 
used to disguise the alter ego's use of its assets for his own benefit in fraud of its 
creditors. In short, the evidence must show that the corporation's owners abused the legal 
separation of a corporation from its owners and used the corporation for illegitimate 
purposes." Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1521 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
commingling or lack of formalities or how the claimants relied on the entities' 
separateness of the lack thereof. Id. 
This is the essence of the alter ego causation element. There must be some causal 
link between the misuse of the corporate form and the damage or harm that disregarding 
the corporate form will remedy or prevent. The Trust failed to demonstrate this causative 
link. Its complaints about the loans fail because they were, on balance, repaid, (R.1372-
73 | 72-73), and there is no finding of self-dealing or bad faith. Indeed, when Mr. Rice 
had the opportunity to take personal advantage of the "loose [financial] environment" (R. 
1374 % 76)—such as when Mr. d'Elia told him to repay himself from Bridlevale funds— 
Rice declined. (R. 1371 \ 70). Complaints about informalities fail, first because they 
were partly the Trust's own doing, and second because they had nothing to do with 
Cherry Hills' inability to repay the Trust's loans or Bridlevale's failure to deliver a profit. 
The Trust's argument is seductive. After all—as the Trust might phrase it—why 
should Mr. Rice escape liability when neither Rice Inc. nor Rice LLC could act without 
him? This seemingly modest proposal seduces because it emphasizes just two of several 
factors: (1) control by Mr. Rice and (2) the Trust's losses. The Trust would have the 
Court believe that the former led inexorably to the latter. But at best that is an argument 
that Mr. Rice used poor judgment and that the Trust's proposed consequences should 
follow. Poor judgment may describe the "loose environment concerning financial 
matters," (R. 1374 f 76), but poor judgment is not self-dealing, and that poor judgment 
was shared, even supported, by the Trust. (R. 1375 f 78; R. 1374 % 76). 
G. The Rymco overcharge is not a basis for imposing personal liablility. 
The Trust contends that an apparent Rymco overcharge at Bridlevale, and the fact 
that Mr. Rice received a distribution from Rymco, demonstrates a "secret profit," 
justifying alter ego liability. (App. Brf. at 61). This claim utterly disregards the evidence. 
First, there is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Rice received any money from the apparent 
overcharge. In addition, it was undisputed that Rymco was framing several other projects 
at the same time as Bridlevale, {See R. 1693 at 316, 405), thus generating revenue from 
several sources (R. 1696 at 859-60) at a time when Rymco was having "some of [its] best 
years." (R. 1696 at 859-60). Inference on this point will not do. The Trust failed to 
demonstrate any personal benefit or self-dealing regarding the overcharge. 
H. The failure to follow certain corporate formalities, while observing 
others, does not support alter ego liability. 
After conceding that Rice Inc. and Rice LLC observed meaningful corporate 
formalities (App. Brf. at 42 and n.12; see R. 1375 f 79), the Trust argues that failure to 
observe every formality should result in personal liability. An informality the Trust 
emphasizes is the use of contract addenda to keep track of construction. (App. Brf. 64). 
Some were signed {see Exs. 357-69); some were not, and some were signed by the same 
person. But the Trust overlooks their purpose. They were merely a tracking mechanism, 
with no effect on the substance of the contracts the court found were arms-length. They 
were "just a formality to let the subs know which houses [were being released for 
construction]." (R. 1693 at 345-46). 
J . The findings concerning missing funds do not support alter ego liability 
because there was no evidence that Mr. Rice benefited personally. 
The Trust concedes that it "was not able to prove that Mr. Rice personally took" 
certain unaccounted for funds. (App. Brf. 66). The Trust then declines a meaningful 
analysis of that central fact. There is no finding that Mr. Rice benefited by the fact that 
several thousand dollars could not be accounted for from the millions of dollars for which 
there is an accurate accounting. The Trust cannot escape the fact that Mr. Rice 
volunteered his own funds—money he was never under any obligation to contribute—to 
assist both projects, or to assist the Trust directly. (R. 1374 \ 75; 1371 \ 70; 1364 \ 34; 
1368 f 54). 
J. There is no finding that Mr. Rice "[affirmatively misled^ the Trust 
concerning the Bridlevale bonds. 
The Trust claims that Mr. Rice "affirmatively misrepresented the status" of certain 
bond money held pending completion of work at Bridlevale. (App. Brf. at 66). Although 
the Trust claims no challenge to the findings, only the conclusions drawn from them, this 
claim directly challenges the finding that Mr. Rice did not engage in fraud. (R. 1377 f 5; 
1377-78 f 6; 1380-81 \ 17). Having failed to marshal the evidence in support of this 
finding, the Trust may not challenge it by merely reasserting the claim. 
Although the bond proceeds were used to pay expenses, some of which were 
incurred in this litigation, the Trust failed to offer any evidence of what share of the 
bonds, if any, belonged to it. The Trust was not entitled to any return from Bridlevale 
until all partnership expenses were paid. (Ex. 31 f 4.8). The Trust merely assumes that 
all of the bond funds were not used to pay legitimate Bridlevale expenses, even though it 
concedes that Rice LLC had to contribute money to finish Bridlevale. (R. 1693 at 290, 
293; 1374 f 75). At a minimum, it was the Trust's burden to demonstrate (1) fraud, 
injustice or self-dealing (bad faith) and (2) what if any portion of the bonds belonged to it 
if it wishes to show injury compensable by the extraordinary remedy of alter ego liability. 
III. THERE IS NO FRAUD OR INJUSTICE TO PREVENT OR UNDO BY IMPOSING 
ALTER EGO LIABILITY. 
The second essential question on this issue is whether honoring the corporate 
existence will "under the circumstances sanction a fraud or promote injustice. In other 
words, bad faith in one form or another must be shown before the court may disregard the 
fiction of separate corporate existence." Hennessey's Tavern v. American Air Filter Co., 
204 Cal.App.3d 1351 (1988). 
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is 
that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, 
and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of 
legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect 
fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association 
of persons . . . . The corporate veil may not be pierced absent a showing of 
improper conduct. 
1 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 41 at 603 (1990 ed.)(footnote omitted). 
Emphasizing the extreme nature of alter ego liability, Sonora Diamond observed 
that "[t]he alter ego doctrine prevents individuals or other corporations from misusing the 
corporate laws by the device of a sham corporate entity formed for the purpose of 
committing fraud or other misdeeds." 83 Cal.App.4th at 538.14 Without a showing of bad 
"It should also be noted that, while the doctrine does not depend on the presence of 
actual fraud, it is designed to prevent what would be fraud or injustice, if accomplished." 
That is why "bad faith . . . is an underlying consideration and will be found in some form 
faith, the Trust has no factual basis for alter ego liability, at least with respect to Rice Inc. 
Cf. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990)(corporation 
was mere sham for personal business of dominant shareholder). 
There is neither a finding nor evidence that Rice Inc. and Rice LLC were "shams," 
formed for the purpose of committing fraud or other "misdeeds" or as mere fronts for Mr. 
Rice's personal business. They actually built and sold hundreds of homes, including 
every home they agreed to build at Cherry Hills and Bridlevale. (R. 1363 f 35; 1368 f 
52). And there is no evidence that Mr. Rice enriched himself at the expense of the 
partnerships. The facts, which the Trust claims not to challenge (App. Brf. at 1), show 
just the opposite. (R. 1374 f 75; 1371 If 70; 1364 f 34; 1368 f 54). 
IV. T H E TRIAL COURT DETERMINED PROPERLY THAT THE REPEATED, 
VOLUNTARY, CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN D'ELIA AND RICE 
WAS A RELEVANT FACTOR ENTITLED TO CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT. 
The trial court concluded that the alter ego claim warranted "closer scrutiny" 
because the relationship between the Trust and Rice Inc. and Rice LLC was voluntary. 
(R. 1376 f 3). In support, the court observed that "Mr. d'Elia and the Trust contracted 
with companies in which Mr. Rice had an ownership interest on four separate occasions." 
Id. The Trust contends that this amounted to a "heightened standard," suggesting the 
court imposed a higher burden of proof. (App. Brf. 30-31). 
Consideration of the nature of the relationship between the parties does not reflect 
a higher burden of proof. When required to weigh multiple and sometimes competing 
or another in those cases wherein the trial court was justified in disregarding the 
corporate entity." Associated Vendors, 210 Cal.App.2d at 838. 
factors, the trial court may in its discretion give more or less weight to any of them, a 
decision surely informed by the presence, or not, of other relevant factors. See, e.g., 
Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 746 (Utah App. 2004)(discretion in 
weighing factors for leave to amend). 
This is precisely the kind of "discretion" the trial court enjoys "in its application of 
the law to a given fact situation." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). "The 
trial court is in a superior position to weight fact-intensive considerations because 'it is 
before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the evidence is adduced."' 
State v. Levin, 101 P.3d 846, 853 n.l (Utah App. 2004), quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
The trial court weighed this factor correctly: 
The obvious difference between consensual and nonconsensual transactions 
is that the claimants in consensual transactions generally have chosen the 
parties with whom they have dealt and have some ability, through personal 
guarantees, security agreements, or similar mechanisms, to protect 
themselves from loss. For example, the fact that a company is 
undercapitalized can be overcome in many contractual settings, because the 
parties can allocate the risk of financial failure as they see fit. But in 
nonconsensual cases, there is no element of voluntary dealing, and the 
question is whether it is reasonable for businessmen to transfer a risk of 
loss or injury to members of the general public through the device of 
conducting business in the name of a corporation that may be marginally 
financed. 
Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tex.L. Rev. 979, 984-85 (1971). 
The Trust notes correctly that Utah has yet formally to recognize this factor. But a 
number of other authorities have. See generally 1 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 41.85 at 460 
(1983)("Courts have generally been more likely to disregard the corporate entity in tort 
cases than in cases of contract. . . ."); F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, Limited Liability and 
the Corporation, 52 U.Chi.L.Rev. 89, 112 (1985)(discussing economic justification for 
treating tort and contract cases differently for corporate veil purposes); Edwards v. 
Monogram Indus., 730 F.2d 977, 980-84 (5th Cir. 1984)(en banc)(discussing distinction 
between tort and contract cases for corporate veil purposes). These authorities are cited 
in Cascade Energy, 896 F.2d at 1584(applying Utah law). 
Both parties to a contract seek some form of profit or benefit. A party knowingly 
contracting with a corporation "is expected to suffer the consequences of the limited 
liability associated with the corporate business form . . . . " 1 FLETCHER, § 41.85 (2004). 
See also Paine v. Carter, 469 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tex. App.1971), writ ref d n.r.e.("where 
a party knows of the relationship between a corporation and its shareholder and chooses 
freely and voluntarily to deal with them in their respective capacities, he is estopped to 
claim that the corporation is the alter ego of the individual (or the reverse thereof)". 
Utah decisions support this distinction. See, e.g., Centurian Corp., 562 P.2d 
1252(piercing not allowed in sales contract dispute); Dockstader, 510 P.2d 526(piercing 
not allowed in employment contract dispute). "The law enables parties to freely contract, 
establishing terms and allocating risks between them." Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 
972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998). The Trust did not bargain for the right to reach Mr. Rice 
personally if its' loans or other investments were not repaid. See also Baker v. Dataphase, 
Inc., 781 F. Supp. 724 (D. Utah 1992)(piercing denied; plaintiffs admitted they knew 
their contracts were with corporate entities). 
"[Cjloser scrutiny" was appropriate. The parties were in business repeatedly, and 
those business operations were more or less identical. (R. 13591f 19; App. Brf. 16). The 
partnerships—Park Hill, Old Mountain, Cherry Hills and Bridlevale—were managed the 
same, using virtually the same partnership agreement and all the same people. (R. 1360 % 
20; 1367 f 49; App. Brf. 49, 23). The Trust seeks to pierce in the third and fourth of 
these four voluntary transactions—the two where it lost money. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DECIDED CORRECTLY NOT TO IMPOSE PERSONAL 
LIABILITY BASED FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
"[PJartners are trustees of each other, and in all proceedings connected with the 
conduct of the partnership every partner is bound to act in the highest good faith to his 
copartner and may not obtain any advantage over him in the partnership affairs by the 
slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any kind." Leffv. 
Gunter, 658 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1983), cited by the Trust (App. Brf. 71). Utah law is similar. 
A partner engaging in "concealment and deriv[ing] a benefit" from such conduct must 
account to the partnership. Nelson v. Matsch, 110 P.2d 865 (Utah 1910). 
There is not a single finding that Mr. Rice benefited personally at the expense of 
either of the partnerships or the Trust or otherwise took advantage of his position. Not 
even the apparent overcharge at Bridlevale was shown to have benefited Rice personally. 
The findings are to the contrary. Mr. Rice contributed personal funds to assist the 
partnerships, and agreed on behalf of Rice Inc. and Rice LLC to waive hundreds of 
thousands in supervision fees, also to assist the partnerships. There is no improper or 
suspect benefit to remedy by imposing personal liability. 
In Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison,, 70 P.3d 35 (Utah 2003), cited 
by the Trust, the court observed the general rule that "[a]n officer or director of a 
corporation is not personally liable for torts of the corporation . . . but can only incur 
personal liability by participating in the wrongful activity." Id, at 41. And a corporate 
official is "individually liable for fraudulent acts or false representations of his own or in 
which he participates, even though his action in such respect may be in furtherance of the 
corporate business." /{/.(emphasis in Harrison). 
Despite the Trust's preferred reading of Armed Forces, however, liability for fraud 
in that case was based on actual fraudulent conduct. 
A finding of fraud must be based on the existence of all its essential 
elements. . . . '[F]raud is a wrong of such nature that it must be shown by 
clear and convincing proof and will not lie in mere suspicion or innuendo.5" 
[citations omitted] . . . Thus, to prevail against Harrison in this case, AFIE 
was required to present evidence that clearly and convincingly established 
every essential element of fraud. 
Id. at 43(emphasis added). 
If, in other words, the corporate agent directs or authorizes the wrongful act, the 
agent can be liable. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co,, 598 P.2d 45, 52 (Cal. 1979). In 
Wyatt, the corporate officers affirmatively misrepresented the terms of a loan, thus 
breaching fiduciary duties owed by their corporation to the plaintiffs. Id, at 780, 783. 
They were personally liable for that fraud. The same was true in Filet Menu, Inc, v. 
C.C.L.&G., Inc, 79 Cal.App.4th 852 (2000), which relied on Wyatt, and which is also 
cited by the Trust. (App. Brf. 72). 
The Trust also relies on a series of cases that began with In re USACafes, LP,, 600 
A.2d 43 (Del.Ch. 1991). The other decisions include Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175 
(Del. Ch. 1999), Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, LP, 792 A.2d 977 (Del. Ch. (2001), In re 
Boston Celtics etc,, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 166. 
The compelling characteristic shared by these cases is that each time personal 
liability was based on self-dealing or bad faith. For example, in Gelfman, the individual 
directors of the corporate general partner owned direct interests in the partnership and 
were alleged to have "increased [their] proportionate ownership in the Partnership at the 
expense of [the plaintiff]'' 792 A.2d at 993(emphasis added). The same is true of 
USACafes, a case about self-dealing and bad faith. Id. at 49, 50. This was also the claim 
in In re Boston Celtics and Time Warner v. Six Flags, 537 S.E.2d 397 (Ga. App. 2000), a 
case of the same genre.15 
The prohibition against self-dealing is implicit in Utah's long-held understanding 
of the fiduciary relationship. "The fiduciary relationship of a general partner to a limited 
partner is one of loyalty, trust, disclosure, and confidence, calling for the utmost good 
faith and permitting no unfair benefits to the general partner as against the limited 
partner." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 82 P.3d 1064, 1074 (Utah 2003)(emphasis added). 
Delaware is often criticized for the lack of predictability caused by its ever-changing 
corporate rules and exceptions. See, e.g., "Boss of the Bosses," in Legal Affairs, 
July/August 2005. Its population is "less than one-third of one percent of the nation, but 
it is the state of incorporation for more than fifty percent of U.S. public companies and 
more than sixty percent of the Fortune 500." K. Greenfield, Democracy and the 
Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 135 (2004). 
"Delaware law reflects a political equilibrium among the various interest groups within 
the state in which the lawyers enjoy a dominant position." J. Macey & G. Miller, Toward 
an Interest-Group Theory of American Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987). 
The facts of this case show just the opposite of self-dealing or unfair benefits. 
The Trust proposes what amounts to disgorgement. The Trust suggests that in a 
case of self-dealing, the court should impose personal liability on the individual charged 
with corporate fiduciary responsibility for managing the affairs of the partnership. That 
liability, however, should follow the money. If the individual tortfeasor gained at the 
expense of his charges—in this case the two partnerships and the Trust—then that gain 
should be disgorged. Applying the reasoning of USACafes and similar cases, it is clear 
that this case lacks those predicate facts. Mr. Rice did not benefit at the expense of the 
Trust or the partnerships. There is no finding he benefited at all. 
Unable to demonstrate self-dealing by or personal enrichment of Mr. Rice at the 
Trust's expense, the Trust resorts to the unsupported claim that Rice deserves personal 
liability because he "stripped Rice Inc. and Rice LLC of any ability to repay their 
obligations to the Trust." (App. Brf. 74). First, there is no finding to support this 
dramatic claim. All Mr. Rice did was take a lawful salary or distribution from his 
business, at a time when it (1) was flush after the success at Park Hill (R. 1357 f10 ; 1694 
at 403-04), or (2) when it was involved in several other simultaneous construction 
projects and receiving revenue as a result. (R. 1694 at 405; R.1696 at 859-60). And still 
16
 Rice's contributions to the partnerships are not a basis on which to pierce. The fact 
that the shareholder personally lends or contributes money to the corporation "for the 
purpose of assisting [the corporation] in meeting its financial obligations" is not a reason 
to pierce. Sonora Diamond, 83 Cal.App.4th at 539. Only if the funds are loaned or used 
'for the purpose of perpetuating a fraud' does that conduct warrant bypassing the 
corporate veil. Id.(emphasis added). See also, e.g., Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. 
Celotex, 166 B.R. 461 (M.D. Fla. 1994). 
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the Trust downplays Rice's personal cash contributions and the Trust's own willingness 
to "strip" both Cherry Hills and Bridlevale of whatever funds they had whenever they had 
them, and even when they did not. (R. 1692 at 149-50)(Trust was willing to force Cherry 
Hills to borrow funds to pay consulting fees; (R. 1692 at 160)(d'Elia needed money and 
did not care where it came from). 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN NOT IMPOSING PERSONAL 
LIABILITY BASED ON CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD. 
Relying on Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) and other cases, the 
Trust contends that its burden of proving fraud was diminished, and that it satisfied that 
burden by demonstrating constructive fraud. (App. Brf. 76-77). Citing Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), for example, the Trust contends that by proving that 
a transaction benefited Rice Inc. and/or Rice LLC, it obviated the need to establish intent. 
The Trust quotes Blodgett correctly for the principle that constructive fraud, if 
established, relieves a party from having to prove intent. A confidential relationship, 
however, "is a prerequisite to proving constructive fraud." Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 769. 
That relationship "rests upon the principle of inequality between the parties." Id., quoting 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965). It is not a function of 
confidence or trust in the ordinary meaning of those terms. "Mere confidence in one 
person by another is not sufficient alone to constitute such a relationship." Bradbury, 401 
P.2dat713. 
Constructive fraud requires "extraordinary influence," Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302, 
such that a party "substitutes his will" for the other, and where the dependant party 
effectively "relinquishes control over her own decision-making." Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 
770. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 710 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985)(insured 
"relinquishes any right to negotiate on his own behalf/5 becoming "wholly dependant"). 
This is a question of fact on which the Trust did not prevail. Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 
302. There is no finding of such dominance. See also Bradbury, 401 P.2d 
710(confidential relationship "must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there is 
superior influence on one side and dependence on the other.")(emphasis added). And it is 
a factual issue left unchallenged on this appeal. 
On behalf of the Trust, Mr. d'Elia exerted extraordinary authority—extraordinary 
for a limited partner—in both Cherry Hills and Bridlevale. He conceded that he was 
involved in critical matters, including such managerial decisions as the kind of houses to 
build (R. 1361-62 If 30) and whether to halt construction at Cherry Hills to wait out the 
recession. Id, f 31. Specifically, he testified as follows concerning options for how to 
address the slow sales at Cherry Hills: 
A. I believe that's what I just referred to, Mr. Wright, when I 
was saying that if we shut it down completely we'd only be 
saving $4,000 or $5,000 a month over continuing to create a 
saleable product. I chose to continue to produce a saleable 
product. 
Q. This is the time when you decided to go to the smaller 
homes? 
To prevail by establishing a confidential relationship, the Trust had to overcome a 
presumption. Merely establishing that Mr. d'Elia and Mr. Rice trusted each other was 
insufficient. "The law presumes that one ordinarily makes his or her own judgments, 
however imperfect, and acts on them; it does not readily assume that one's will has been 
overborne by another. Therefore, the law does not lightly recognize the existence of a 
confidential relationship." Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 769. 
A. That's correct. 
(R. 1692 at 144). 
He "consented" to the formation and use of the in-house subcontractors. (R. 1359 
Tf 15). He "approved of loans between Cherry Hills and Bridlevale." Id. *f 72. As 
already pointed out, when he wanted money, he got it, despite the fact that his extraction 
of cash from Bridlevale was a straight violation of the Bridlevale agreement. He 
negotiated bogus consulting fees that were nothing more than an interest payment on his 
investment, even if it meant Cherry Hills had to borrow to pay him. (R. 1692 at 149-50; 
see also Ex. 127). He instructed Mr. Rice to repay himself $100,000 from Bridlevale, 
which Mr. Rice did not do. (R. 1371 f 70). Because his funds were necessary for the 
transaction, he made the decision to buy out another Bridlevale partner. (R. 1370 f 64). 
These are not the actions of someone who has surrendered his will. 
Furthermore, the fact that both Rice Inc. and Rice LLC waived their respective 
and already discounted supervision fees in order to aid the projects, (R. 1363 % 34; 1368 f 
54), and Rice's own cash contributions, flatly contradict any claim that Rice exerted 
some sort of self-serving, extraordinary influence over the Trust or benefited by virtue of 
his position at the Trust's expense. 
The Trust contends that Rice Inc. and Rice LLC "failed to account" for missing 
funds. That is not the same as demonstrating that Mr. Rice or Rice Inc. took those funds 
or that some transaction benefited Mr. Rice or Rice Inc. at the Trust's expense. They 
were not accounted for, which is a proper basis for the judgments against Rice Inc. and 
Rice LLC. The further step of visiting those judgments on Mr. Rice requires some kind 
of self-dealing or benefit obtained by virtue of his position. There is no such finding. 
Because the Trust cannot link its losses—consisting primarily of the unpaid 
Cherry Hills model home loans—to any breach of duty, it fails on an essential element. 
The Trust would have the court remake corporate law (under either or all three of its 
fiduciary duty, alter ego and constructive fraud claims) so that the beneficiary of any such 
duty need only establish bad judgment and error—in this case unaccounted for money— 
to impose the ultimate remedy of personal liability (to say nothing of the Trust's 
undisputed complicity in the very conduct it uses to invoke that remedy), all in the 
service of debt collection. 
The Trust's unrestricted access to partnership information requires that it prove 
intent to defraud. 
When the allegedly harmed partner "has ample access to information" about the 
partnership, his burden on a fraud claim remains. "Whatever duty of affirmative 
disclosure might exist in a circumstance where the partners have decidedly unequal 
access to information about the nature or value of the partnership assets, that duty does 
not exist or was not violated on the facts of this case." Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 
1017 (Utah 1982). 
The Trust highlights the court's finding that Mr. d'Elia was not aware of the full 
"scope or extent" of the inter-company loans. But d'Elia was aware that loans and other 
transfers were made, approved some of them, and as pointed out above was perfectly 
willing to move money around and force loans, regardless of the source, when expedient. 
Moreover, the court found that Mr. Rice was in "regular contact with Mr. d'Elia, 
providing updates or status reports . . . ." (R. 1362-63 ^ 32). Mr. d'Elia received regular 
financial reports. Id. He admitted at trial that any time he needed any information he got 
it with a simple phone call. (R. 1692 at 147). 
Mr. Rice never denied that several thousand dollars (from the millions involved) 
could not be accounted for. But what the Trust omits is the fact that Rice Inc.'s and Rice 
LLC's own books and records disclosed the nature and amount of those funds, almost to 
the penny. The apparent overcharge by Rymco, for example, came directly from Rice 
LLC's own records. Neither Mr. Rice nor John Swarm, who by then was managing 
Rymco and handled the billing, could explain the apparent overcharge, and Swarm was 
confident there was no overcharge and that some mistake had been made. (R.1696 at 
835). There was also doubt about the amount. (R. 1693 at 302-03). 
But just as clearly there is no evidence that Mr. Rice caused this overcharge or 
benefited by it, a fact therefore that informed the court's decision not to impose personal 
liability because there was no evidence of unfair advantage or self-dealing. This is not to 
challenge the finding about the overcharge; only to illustrate the evidence the trial court 
weighed in deciding whether personal liability was appropriate. 
VII. THE TRUST IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL, 
A new trial is a matter of trial court discretion. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799. That 
remedy must be based on one of rule 59's factors. Schindler v. Schindler, 116 P.2d 84 
(Utah App. 1989). 
The Trust relies on Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 20 P.3d 388 (Utah 2001), 
claiming that the appellate court remanded for a new trial based on the trial court's 
erroneous dismissal of claims "supported by uncontradicted evidence." (App. Brf. 78). 
The Trust's recitation leaves out the significant fact that the Bair trial court dismissed 
after the close of plaintiff s case. 20 P.3d at 390. 
The question in Bair was, therefore, whether plaintiff made a prima facie case 
sufficient to survive dismissal, and specifically whether plaintiff had established the 
elements of a breach of contract. Id. at 391-392. "[T]he trial court erred in dismissing 
[plaintiffs] entire case without giving any consideration to the uncontradicted evidence 
that [plaintiff] had established a prima facie case . . . ." Id. at 393. The emphasized 
language distinguishes Bair. There is no claim, and no basis to claim, that the trial court 
failed to consider all of the Trust's evidence. 
Instead, the Trust's new trial argument amounts to the predictable appellant's 
claim that the trial court erred in its judgment of the facts—that it should have weighed 
those facts differently and in favor of a different result. On this issue, deference to the 
trial court is at its greatest. It had the advantaged position to weigh evidence, to 
determine its persuasive value and to rule accordingly, which is to say to determine 
whether the facts came within the reach of a given rule of law. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 
936; Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). 
The Trust had its opportunity to demonstrate fraud or injustice and bad faith, a 
confidential relationship or self-dealing. A new trial will not change the law. Neither 
will it change the facts, which even the Trust concedes the trial court got right. (App. Brf. 
1). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
David C. Wright 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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ACCOLADES FOR LIVING 
As a tribute to our commitment to excellence, Rice Development has 
received national recognition for its efforts, receiving the Grand Award 
for "Best Affordable Home" by Better Homes and Gardens, an Elan 
Award for "Best Architectural Design" and a Laurel Award for 
"Best Project of the Year." 
As further testimony to the quality of our homes, Rice Development 
was named the number 1 Builder for Energy Efficient Homes by the 
American Gas Institute. 
To live in an award winning home is now an affordable reality. 
